On June 30, 2014, two Ryanair Boeing 738, one intended to fly to Warsaw (Poland), the other to Frankfurt (Germany), violently collided into each other at Stansted Airport, causing major damages to both aircrafts. The crash destroyed one wing and one tail completely. No passenger was hurt during the collision, however a passenger commented the news on Twitter and took pictures.
A formal inquiry was launched.
On June 24, 2014, a Transavia B738 from Paris Orly (France) to Budapest (Hungary) experienced hydraulic leak in system A about 5nm south of Frankfurt. The flight crew chose to return to Paris Orly instead.
On June 23, 2014, a Germanwings A319 from Cologne, Germany en route to London Heahtrow (UK) experienced flaps control issues while descending to the airport. The plane was diverted to and landed safely in Hamburg.
On June 23, 2014, a Ryanair B738 from Dublin (Ireland) en route to Reus (Spain) experienced severe turbulence that injured 5 occupants (2 passengers, 3 cabin crew). Medical assistance and an ambulance was required.
On June 2, 2014, an easyJet A320 from Tenerife Norte Los Rodeos to Tenerife Sur Sofia Reina (Tenerife South) declared fuel emergency as it reached Tenerife North and had to do a go around. Unfavourable weather conditions forced the airline to abort its approach twice at Tenerife South before that.
The incident was rated as serious and a formal investigation was opened.
On May 31, 2014, a Ryanair B738 at Eindhoven, Netherlands experienced unstable approach and loss of speed during go-around that posed a significant threat to aviation safety. The incident itself was analysed by the Dutch Onderzoeksraad (DSB) which released their final report below. A further analysis of the event is given in details by the website Aviation Herald.
Eindhoven Tower Control
- Eindhoven Tower Control, when deciding on the runway in use, did not have information available regarding the upper winds and thus did not take into consideration these winds in the IFR traffic pattern. The choice of landing runway resulted in the aircraft drifting on base leg and encountering a tailwind on final that influenced the rate of decent.
Eindhoven Arrival Control
- Eindhoven Arrival Control had no information about the upper winds . The controller did not take into account the influence of the these winds when giving radar guided approaches. This resulted in a line up too short for the final approach.
- Eindhoven Arrival Control did not follow the procedures correctly regarding the following:
–– inform the flight crew beforehand when radar vectors can be expected for the approach;
–– intercepting an ILS glide path should be executed from below in accordance with published procedures;
–– active monitoring of the aircraft flight path during vectoring;
–– transfer of aircraft from Arrival Control to Tower Control without confirmation that the aircraft is established on the ILS or without coordination.
- The flight crew did not take into account the influence of the upper winds. In combination with the aircraft’s high vertical profile and high speed in relation to the runway distance, a landing in accordance with standard operating procedures became impossible.
- The flight crew did not challenge air traffic control and postponed the decision to make a go-around. It is likely that the crew’s high level of confidence in the very reliable automation in the cockpit contributed to this.
- The flight crew did not have proper guidance procedures to avoid false glide slope capture in relation to the distance to the runway threshold (during an autopilot coupled ILS glide slope approach from above, under instrument meteorological conditions).
- The flight crew initiated the actions for the stall recovery maneuver according to the Boeing FCTM. A second stick shaker warning occurred after the control column was relaxed and the crew again correctly initiated the stall recovery maneuver.
- During an autopilot coupled ILS approach the aircraft, flying at an altitude above the normal 3 degree glide slope, followed the fly-up signal after crossing the 9 degrees false glide slope. This resulted in a nose high position of the aircraft causing the stick shaker warning to occur.
- The Boeing 737NG Flight Crew Training Manual did not warn of possible false glide slope capture with a pitch-up upset during an autopilot coupled ILS approach. This resulted in an ‘automation surprise’ for the flight crew.
- The Eindhoven occurrence was initially reported and assessed by the operator as a minor event which did not warrant CVR and FDR retention.
Separate investigation into ILS Findings from the Eindhoven incident revealed characteristics of ILS signals that were not generally known. During the investigation it became clear that the Eindhoven incident was not unique. Other incidents took place with different types of aircraft, operated by different airlines, on approaches to different airports. These findings led the Dutch Safety Board to conclude that unknown ILS signal characteristics pose a significant threat to aviation safety and the Board decided to address this issue separately. The main conclusions of the separate investigation were:
- The ILS Image Type antenna category signal characteristics of false glide paths and corresponding cockpit instrument warnings do not correspond with generally received wisdom and training.
- Signal Reversal sometimes occurs at approximately 6 degree glide path and always at the 9 degree glide path angle. Additionally, cockpit instruments do not present corresponding ILS warnings.
- The area above the certified 3 degree ILS which is the 5.25 degree glide path and onward, is not part of the ILS Flight Inspection programme and therefore not part of the ILS ICAO certified volume of operation. Consequently, aircraft flying above the certified volume of operation are exposed to risks related to ILS Signal Reversal and subsequent unexpected automatic flight system response resulting in severe pitch up.
- Automated systems on board of aircraft assist the aircrew in performing there tasks on board and should never endanger the aircraft, passengers or crew without giving a clear, recognizable warning and ample time for the crew to react.
- Flight crews’ decisions tot execute a go aurond or to challenge Air Traffic Control seem to be postponed too long when flying high above the normal vertical profile during an ILS apporach. There is reason to believe that the high level of very reliable automation in the cockpit contributes to this and that altitude versus distance basic flying skills are insufficiently practiced.
The report of the ILS signal anomaly was issued contemporaneously.
Airline crew members will be shielded from reprisals when they report incidents to air safety authorities, according to new legislation agreed by all EU institutions yesterday (17 December).
The European Parliament’s transport committee endorsed a compromise text yesterday (17 December), negotiated with EU member states earlier in December, on new EU rules aimed at strengthening air safety and accident prevention, also known as the regulation on “occurrence reporting.
On January 4, 2014, a Flybe Dash 8-400 from Geneva en route to Wales made an emergency landing in Paris.
Eye witness reported on Twitter the crew was concerned with left engine, but later stated it was due to hydraulic failure.
On December 21, 2013, a Germanwings Airbus A319-100, registration D-AGWQ performing flight 4U-7286 from Hamburg (Germany) to Klagenfurt (Austria), was enroute at FL370 in Czech airspace about 95nm northnorthwest of Vienna (Austria) when the crew reported a cracked windshield and requested a descent.
The aircraft landed safely in Vienna 75 minutes after scheduled landing at Klagenfurt.
On September 15, 2013, a Hop Canadair CRJ-700, registration F-GRZE performing flight DB-4526/AF-5337 from Lyon (France) to Venice (Italy), was enroute near Milan (Italy) when the crew declared emergency reporting problems with the flight controls. The aircraft diverted to Milan’s Malpensa Airport for a safe landing.
Following investigations, it appears that the aircraft experienced a roll and yaw trim malfunction.
On December 4, 2013, a Pegasus Boeing 737-800, registration TC-AAE performing flight PC-705 from Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen (Turkey) to Milan Bergamo (Italy) suffered a bird strike shortly after take-off, according to eye witness. A replacement Boeing was provided later on.
On November 8, 2013, a Ryanair Boeing 737-800, registration EI-DPF performing flight FR-2355 from Tangier (Morocco) to Dusseldorf Niederrhein (Germany) diverted to Seville (Spain) after passengers reported fumes on board.
The aircraft landed safely, and an investigation was opened.
On October 25, 2013, an An Air Nostrum Canadair CRJ-900 on behalf of Iberia, registration EC-JYA performing flight YW-8322/IB-8322 from Madrid,SP to San Sebastian,SP (Spain) damaged its landing gear following a strong deceleration after the touch down.
On September 1st, 2013, an Aeroflot Sukhoi Superjet 100-95, registration RA-89005 performing flight SU-2004 from Moscow Sheremetyevo (Russia) to Krakow (Poland) with 74 people on board, was on approach to Krakow when the crew received indication of a slats malfunction, stopped the descent at 4000 feet, worked the relevant checklists and decided to divert to Warsaw (Poland) for a flaps up landing. The aircraft climbed to FL100 for the diversion and landed safely on Warsaw’s runway 33 at a higher than normal speed about 75 minutes after aborting the approach to Krakow.
On September 18, 2013, a Ryanair Boeing 737-800, registration EI-DAK performing flight FR-2037 from Palma Mallorca,SP (Spain) to Dortmund (Germany), was on approach to Dortmund’s runway 24 when the aircraft was struck by lightning. The aircraft continued for a safe landing on runway 24. The return flight FR-2038 needed to be postponed to the next day. A replacement Boeing 737-800 registration EI-ENT reached Mallorca with a delay of 11 hours.
On September 14, 2013, an Easyjet Airbus A319-100, registration G-EZIZ performing flight U2-5232 from Pisa (Italy) to London Gatwick,EN (UK), was in the initial climb out of Pisa’s runway 04R when the crew reported a bird strike into an engine (CFM56). The crew stopped the climb at 3000 feet and returned to Pisa for a safe landing on runway 04R about 35 minutes after departure. The airport was closed for about one hour due to the emergency.
On September 11, 2013 an Air Berlin Airbus A321-200, registration D-ABCF performing flight AB-9152 from Berlin Tegel (Germany) to Palma Mallorca,SP (Spain) with 140 passengers, was enroute at FL350 about 50nm north of Nuremberg (Germany) when the crew decided to divert to Nuremberg due to an unusual, unidentifyable smell near the lavatory. The aircraft landed safely, however two cabin crew members were taken to a hospital, where they were diagnosed with smoke inhalation.
On September 3rd, 2013, a Flybe de Havilland Dash 8-400, registration G-JECR performing flight BE-806 from London Gatwick,EN to Newquay,EN (UK) with 44 people on board, was enroute when passengers alerted the crew of seeing fluid exiting an engine. The aircraft continued to Newquay for a safe landing with emergency services on stand by. The aircraft vacated the runway and stopped on the taxiway, the passengers disembarked onto the taxiway and were bussed to the terminal.
On August 20, 2013, Ryanair Boeing 737-800, registration EI-EMI performing flight FR-1228 from Tenerife Sur Reina Sofia,CI (Spain) to Billund (Denmark) with 177 passengers, was climbing out of Tenerife’s runway 08 when the crew stopped the climb at FL070 reporting engine trouble, descended the aircraft to 4000 feet to burn off fuel and returned to Tenerife for a safe landing on runway 08 about 2 hours after departure.
On August 16, 2013, a Ryanair Boeing 737-800, registration EI-EGD performing flight FR-7602 from Bremen (Germany) to Vilnius (Lithuania) with 164 passengers, rejected takeoff from Bremen’s runway 09 at low speed after the crew noticed a strong odour in the cockpit. The aircraft slowed safely and returned to the apron.